Time Travel in a Traveller campaign

[Grav_Moped]

And we have two separate issues here -- or, rather, one issue and a subset of that issue.

The first is continuity of consciousness/identity (is your memory-transferred clone "you"?).

The second is how that's understood and treated (ethically and legally) in the fictional universe in question.

 

[Grav_Moped]

And we have two separate issues here -- or, rather, one issue and a subset of that issue.

The first is continuity of consciousness/identity (is your memory-transferred clone "you"?).

The second is how that's understood and treated (ethically and legally) in the fictional universe in question.

From a solipsistic perspective (where Mike is coming from), no, it's not "you". You presumably died, and at that point there is no more "you" in-universe.

On the other hand, you've created someone who believes they're you -- and by most external tests, can prove it.

From a meta-game perspective, the fact that your player character is in a new body doesn't matter because that body is just words and numbers on a character sheet. Its consciousness and identity resides in the player's mind. So, in an RPG, PCs really do have immortal (with respect to the game) souls! It's also why the question of which of multiple clones is the "real one" doesn't come up often: the player only controls one at a time.

The question is whether everyone else accepts the duplicate as you. There are practical reasons for others to do so, as well as practical reasons why they may choose not to.

 

[mike wightman]

Ok look at it like this.

You copy your character sheet to make a clone and tear up the original.

You give the clone to a different player to play, since your character is dead and you have to roll a new character.

 

[Grav_Moped]

Ok look at it like this.

You copy your character sheet to make a clone and tear up the original.

You give the clone to a different player to play, since your character is dead and you have to roll a new character.

Yes and no. Yes, because subjectively that's exactly what happens. No, because from an RPG perspective the other player will inevitably RP the character incorrectly -- they're not you, and they won't make the same choices you would. In order to maintain the necessary continuity, it needs to be the same player.

This is a game artifact (and in fiction, a narrative one), not a philosophical point.

 

[Grav_Moped]

And this makes the Star Trek universe weird.

Transporters routinely kill people and create their exact duplicates elsewhere. And everyone except Scotty just accepts this, ignoring the genocidal institutionalized murder/suicide system and treating the duplicates as the originals as though nothing is wrong.

 

[mike wightman]

Yes and no. Yes, because subjectively that's exactly what happens. No, because from an RPG perspective the other player will inevitably RP the character incorrectly -- they're not you, and they won't make the same choices you would. In order to maintain the necessary continuity, it needs to be the same player.

This is a game artifact (and in fiction, a narrative one), not a philosophical point.

But that is exactly the point - the cloned you will now make different decisions to the decisions that you make.

Let's assume you keep both alive, but you keep them separate, you then put them in identical situations, they will make different choices.

 

[Grav_Moped]

But that is exactly the point - the cloned you will now make different decisions to the decisions that you make.

Let's assume you keep both alive, but you keep them separate, you then put them in identical situations, they will make different choices.

Over time, yes, as they accumulate different experiences. In the short term, they'll act similarly.

Specifically to the point, on "reboot" they'll both subjectively be identical to the original and to each other (not objectively, because neither is the original -- who no longer exists in this hypothetical).

 

[kilemall]

So should there be an equivalent Turing test for clone originality?


Maybe a serial number coded in DNA strands for made/grown clones 'proves' copy status, or at least which one is to be considered 'the person'?

 

[Condottiere]

1. You need a definition for existence.

2. If you give existence status to artificial intelligence, you know that's one thing that can be duplicated perfectly on another hard drive. Or lots more.

3. And if you think that using different physical materials contained in those different hard drives would differentiate them at the moment of duplication, than there's always virtual drives.

 

[Grav_Moped]

So should there be an equivalent Turing test for clone originality?


Maybe a serial number coded in DNA strands for made/grown clones 'proves' copy status, or at least which one is to be considered 'the person'?

There's probably some way to test for it. You'd need something akin to a Turing test to figure out whether a clone has the personality and memories of its "parent". Think in terms of password recovery hints, but as a systematic biographical examination.

The problem is that how memory-overlaid clones would be perceived would be socially constructed. And that depends on the relative power (wealth, social influence, etc.) of the class of people making clones of themselves with the intent of having the clone be recognized as "them", versus that of those who stand to gain by having them not be so recognized.

It doesn't matter what the clone thinks, if nobody else recognizes their claim.

 

[Werner]

That doesn't make sense.
We know which is the original since that is the one that was copied.

Do we? What if we lose the information about which one was the original can the original or the copy tell from his memories alone which one is which? Having a third person point out which is which is cheating, and it is an academic exercise at best, from the first person prospecting a person is split in two each time he is copied.

 

[Werner]

That doesn't make sense.
We know which is the original since that is the one that was copied.

Both the copy and the original have the original's memories so they can't tell, unless they trust a third person telling them who is which. It's possible to set this up so they don't know who is the original and who is the copy since they both have the same memories.

 

[Werner]

There's probably some way to test for it. You'd need something akin to a Turing test to figure out whether a clone has the personality and memories of its "parent". Think in terms of password recovery hints, but as a systematic biographical examination.

The problem is that how memory-overlaid clones would be perceived would be socially constructed. And that depends on the relative power (wealth, social influence, etc.) of the class of people making clones of themselves with the intent of having the clone be recognized as "them", versus that of those who stand to gain by having them not be so recognized.

It doesn't matter what the clone thinks, if nobody else recognizes their claim.

It might if the clone were to eliminate the original and take over his identity! If an unscrupulous man were to clone himself and brain tape all his memories into him, he may have to worry about his clone doing away with him, as that I'd what he would do. The clone, remember, has a memory of his decision to make a clone of himself, and if it was his intension to make his clone subservient to him, then his clone will have the same feelings about the original.

 

[whartung]

Both the copy and the original have the original's memories so they can't tell, unless they trust a third person telling them who is which. It's possible to set this up so they don't know who is the original and who is the copy since they both have the same memories.

The clone is the one without the scars from when he fell off that grav-bike when they were 18.

 

[robject]

You are missing the point - you are 'you', clone you isn't you, so you are dead.
Just because clone you thinks it is you doesn't alter the fact that you are dead, your existence is over.

I think Mike's going in a reasonable direction here.

I also think, Traveller-wise, that there are multiple ways to determine that someone's a clone. There are conventions (e.g. the distinctive markings) -- but not always. There may be cellular- or genetic-level markers, and if it's important to YTU then something like that certainly will be there.

Finally, interstellar empires would have legal rules to manage cloneliness. Establishing identity, for example, would have to take clones into account. If clones were a threat to identity, then perhaps they would be outlawed or strongly regulated.




...Now what does this have to do with Time Travel?

 

[Werner]

The clone is the one without the scars from when he fell off that grav-bike when they were 18.

If you can grow a clone, you could heal scars as well. Heal the scars of the original, and grow a clone with memories, I think a more accurate word would be replicant. As far as the clone is concerned, he is you, because his memories are exactly the same as yours, he is convinced of it, and if you die, he will do what you would have done if you lived.

Cloning and brain taping is a great way to travel through time.

There is another way to travel through time as well.
1. Find a black hole
2. Build a series of concentric shellworld around the black hole, the black hole is around three Solar masses, from a nearby red giant you feed matter into the black hole, matter accumulates in an accretion disk around the black hole, and about half the rest mass of the in falling matter gets converted into energy.
3. The shellworld absorb the radiation from the black hole and radiate it as heat, a fluid circulates through the radiators running steam generators producing electricity.
4. The electricity powers computers in each concentric shell.
5. The computers simulate 1.5 trillion Earths, each virch simulates a day on Earth going back 5 billion years.
6. Brain tape human beings and grow a clone of each person with memories from the original, this is virch 0. Virch 0 is a simulation of the Earth in the present time, this is the most recent day being simulated.
7. In virch 0 you create a "time machine", this time machine has the capability of going from virch 0 (today) to virch 1 (yesterday) and from virch 1 it can go to virch 2 (the day before) and so on.

 

[kilemall]

I think Mike's going in a reasonable direction here.

I also think, Traveller-wise, that there are multiple ways to determine that someone's a clone. There are conventions (e.g. the distinctive markings) -- but not always. There may be cellular- or genetic-level markers, and if it's important to YTU then something like that certainly will be there.

Finally, interstellar empires would have legal rules to manage cloneliness. Establishing identity, for example, would have to take clones into account. If clones were a threat to identity, then perhaps they would be outlawed or strongly regulated.




...Now what does this have to do with Time Travel?

Two ways I can think of.


If you posit a time travel universe (TTU?) in which two yous can exist, you're going to have a similar 'which is the right continuous hometime you' kind of identity problem. Or not, hence story/play shenanigans.


The other is the big problem of conservation of energy by most TTU where the traveller is transported mind and body to whatever time which effectively is adding mass to that time, however small.


Similar issue with jump in that while in jumpspace you are presumably not in the regular universe and thus subtracted the ship and contents mass and adding it back in on transition back to normal space.

 

[Werner]

Two ways I can think of.


If you posit a time travel universe (TTU?) in which two yous can exist, you're going to have a similar 'which is the right continuous hometime you' kind of identity problem. Or not, hence story/play shenanigans.


The other is the big problem of conservation of energy by most TTU where the traveller is transported mind and body to whatever time which effectively is adding mass to that time, however small.


Similar issue with jump in that while in jumpspace you are presumably not in the regular universe and thus subtracted the ship and contents mass and adding it back in on transition back to normal space.

This is only a problem if you assume the universe has only finite mass. The observable universe isn't necessary the entire universe, the Universe could be expanding and yet infinite at the same time. At the big bang, it could have been infinite with infinite density at time zero and as time progressed the energy/mass density for any given finite volume of space decreased as the mass of the overall universe remained infinite. Now as you know if you add a finite amount to an infinite amount, the result is still infinity. Conservation of mass in a infinite mass Universe isn't a problem because whatever amount of mass you add or subtract from it the result always remains infinity.