Commonwealth Airmobile Infantry Battalion

[tbeard1999]

For your enjoyment, here's my vision of a TL13-14 light infantry battalion. Note that my campaign has a couple of key differences from the OTU.

First, no contragrav technology. My troops get around with fusion powered tiltrotor aircraft (you can replace them with grav APCs appropriate for your OTU campaign).

Second, no powered armor. I seriously doubt that the power issues will ever be resolved and in any case, it makes combat troops a little less scary for PCs. This means no infantry portable plasma or fusion weapons.

Overview
1486 personnel (About 1700 with attached Brigade level units).
•HQ Company (26)
•Support Company (124)
•4 x Rifle Companies (244)
•1 x Heavy Weapons Company (156)
•1 x Air Cavalry Platoon (50)
•1 x Light Artillery Battery (48)
•2 x Transport Companies (59)
•1 x Attack Section (10)

The attached PDF file contains a more detailed description of the battalion (I couldn't get COI's formatting to behave).

Comments

The airmobile battalion is the most common Commonwealth battalion. It can lift approximately 40% of its combat forces at one time in the light tiltrotor transports, assuming 80% serviceability rate. Usually, a Light transport section is attached to a platoon to move it. A rifle platoon, plus about ¼ of the company heavy weapons platoon can be lifted by 4 TV-12Cs. The heavy weapons company usually requires four medium transport sections if the vehicles are being lifted. Otherwise, each of its platoons can be lifted by a light transport section.

The attack section and air cavalry platoon are also airmobile. The medium tiltrotors can each lift one VLAV, LAV, MRL, howitzer, or three hummers. Some battalions have a third transport company of 12 light tiltrotor transports (this usually also adds about 8 men to the battalion Air Maintenance Platoon). Some battalions have a second attack section (adding about 4 men to the battalion Air Maintenance Platoon and 4 to the Battalion Armory Platoon). Many battalions in primitive areas replace some or all of their light missile teams with LMG teams or GL teams (2 men with 1 RAM-GL; the second man carries ammunition).

This organization looks much like a typical 20th-21st century military unit. However, there is a significant difference—there are far fewer support troops. A typical early 21st century battalion expeditionary task force would have 1/2 the combat personnel, but a total establishment of 2200 men. The difference is technology and robotics. The Commonwealth leverages technology to improve its “teeth to tail ratio” to levels unimaginable in 20th century expeditionary forces. This is an even greater accomplishment considering that most Commonwealth military units are deployed in frontier areas.

That said, the fact is that Commonwealth units are extremely thin on support assets. Therefore, Commonwealth units often retain significant numbers of native non-combatants to assist with support matters. One extreme case was the 2/155th Mississippi Rifles battalion on Pravus. An unofficial survey indicated that there were 600 native "contractors" attached to the unit.

Equipment Notes

Commonwealth units are organized into 3 unofficial categories—line, regular, and reserve. Line units are at nearly full strength and are equipped to TL13+ standard. Regular units are at nearly full strength and equipped to TL11-13 standard. Reserve units are at cadre strength and equipped to TL9-11 standard.

In addition, various development companies field infantry battalions. Company infantry battalions are organized similarly to Army battalions, though they will often omit missile teams and point defense units.

Troops in Line units will typically have Combat Armor and Gauss Rifles. SAWs will be TL12 Gauss SAWs. LMG units will be equipped with TL12 Gauss LMGs. MMG units will be equipped with TL12 Gauss MMGs. HMG units will be equipped with TL12 Gauss HMGs. Missile units will be equipped with TL12 missiles.

Troops in Regular Units will typically have Combat Armor and Advanced Combat Rifles, although one company is often equipped with gauss rifles. SAWs will be TL10 SAWs. LMG units will be equipped with TL10 LMGs. MMG units will be equipped with TL10 MMGs. HMG units will be equipped with TL 10 HMGs. Missile units will be equipped with TL12 missiles.

Troops in Reserve Units (and some Regular Units) will have Combat Environment Suits and Advanced Combat Rifles. SAWs will be TL10 SAWs. LMG units will be equipped with TL10 LMGs. MMG units will be equipped with TL10 MMGs. HMG units will be equipped with TL 10 HMGs. Missile units will be equipped with TL10 missiles.

Company units will generally be equipped as Regular or Reserve units.

(Continued)

 

[tbeard1999]

Ironmongery

Ironmongery

5 ton HMT (High Mobility Transport) – a hovertruck capable of carrying 5 tons of payload.

Hummer – a robust wheeled vehicle capable of carrying up to 6 people. Most have a Universal Heavy Weapons Mount, which allows fitting of most infantry heavy weapons.

TL8 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW): Treat as Assault Rifle (auto) at Close and Short Range; Assault Rifle +1 at Medium and Long Range. Weight 5.5kg, Cost Cr1500. DEX modifiers: 7(-2)/10(+2). 200 rounds ammo (weighs 2.2 kg).

TL7 MMG: Treat as LMG with tripod, which allows it to fire at extreme range. Weighs 2 kg more than LMG; costs Cr100 more. Extreme range: 1000m.

TL7 HMG: Treat as LMG+1 with tripod, which allows it to fire at extreme range. Weighs 3 kg more than LMG; costs Cr500 more. Extreme range: 1500m.

TL10 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW): Treat as ACR (auto) at Close and Short Range; ACR +1 at Medium and Long Range. Weight 5.5kg, Cost Cr2000. DEX modifiers: 7(-2)/10(+2). 100 rounds ammo (weighs 2.5 kg). Fires all normal ACR rounds. Use LMG rules for firing bursts.

TL10 LMG: Treat as ACR +1 (no firing at close or short range). Weight 6.5kg, Cost Cr2000. DEX modifiers: 7(-2)/10(+2). 200 rounds ammo (weighs 5.0 kg). Fires all normal ACR rounds. Use LMG rules for firing bursts. Typically, each ammo bearer carries 4-8 200 round belts.

TL10 MMG: Treat as TL10 LMG (ACR+1; no firing at close or short range) with tripod. Weighs 2 kg more; costs Cr200 more. 200 rounds ammo (weighs 5.0 kg). Fires all normal ACR rounds. Use LMG rules for firing bursts. Typically, each ammo bearer carries 4-8 200 round belts. Extreme range: 1500m.

TL10 HMG: Treat as ACR+2 (no firing at close or short range) with tripod, which allows it to fire at extreme range. Weighs 3 kg more than LMG; costs Cr500 more. 200 rounds ammo (weighs 5.0 kg). Fires all normal ACR rounds. Use LMG rules for firing bursts. Typically, each ammo bearer carries 4-8 200 round belts. Extreme range: 2000m.

TL12 Gauss SAW: Treat as Gauss Rifle (auto) +1 at medium and long range. Weight: 5.5kg, cost Cr3000. DEX modifiers: 7(-2)/10(+2). 250 rounds ammo (weighs 2.5 kg). Use LMG rules for firing bursts.

TL12 Gauss LMG: Treat as Gauss Rifle +1 at Close and Short range; +2 at medium and long. Weight: 6.5kg, cost Cr5000. DEX modifiers: 7(-2)/10(+2). 500 rounds ammo (weighs 5.0 kg). Use LMG rules for firing bursts. Typically, each ammo bearer carries 4-8 500 round belts.

TL12 Gauss MMG: Treat as Gauss LMG with tripod, which allows it to fire at extreme range. Use LMG rules for bursts. Gauss Rifle +1 at Close and Short range; +2 at medium and long. Weight: 6.5kg, cost Cr5000. DEX modifiers: 7(-2)/10(+2). 500 rounds ammo (weighs 5.0 kg). Use LMG rules for firing bursts, though weapon can fire 4 bursts before rolling for a jam. Extreme range 1500m. Typically, each ammo bearer carries 4-8 500 round belts.

TL12 Gauss HMG: Treat as VRF Gauss Gun -2. Weight: 10.0kg, cost Cr 12,000. DEX modifiers: 7(-2)/10(+2). 500 rounds ammo (weighs 10.0 kg). Use VRF Gauss Gun rules for firing bursts. Extreme range 2000m. Typically, each ammo bearer carries 4-8 500 round belts.

TL10 6cm Automortar. A muzzle-loaded, smooth-bore, high-angle-of-fire automatic weapon. The mortar can be fired in the conventional mode or handheld mode. It can be drop-fired for single shots or trigger-fired for automatic fire. Treat as a TL10 light mortar, with ROF of up to 20. A wide variety of brilliant munitions are available.

TL10 8cm Automortar. A muzzle-loaded, smooth-bore, high-angle-of-fire automatic weapon. The mortar can be fired in the conventional mode or handheld mode. It can be drop-fired for single shots or trigger-fired for automatic fire. Treat as a TL10 medium mortar, with ROF of up to 16. A wide variety of brilliant munitions are available.

TL10 Light AV Missile “Predator”. A lightweight, close range missile system. Weighs 10kg; costs Cr15,000. A brilliant, fire and forget weapon designed to engage and defeat the front armor of most TL10- main battle tanks (and most TL12- light vehicles). Can also engage aircraft. Range: 20m-1000m. Treat as HEAT RAM Grenade +8 for target; HE RAM grenade +3 for fragmentation.

TL10 Medium AV Missile “Cobra”. A medium range manportable missile system. Weighs 20kg; costs Cr30,000. A brilliant, fire and forget weapon designed to engage and defeat the front armor of most TL10- main battle tanks (and most TL13- light vehicles). Can also engage aircraft. Range: 70m-2000m. Treat as HEAT RAM Grenade +8 for target; HE RAM grenade +3 for fragmentation.

TL10 Heavy AV Missile “Nimrod”. A heavy, long range missile system. Weighs 40kg; costs Cr60,000. A brilliant, fire and forget weapon designed to engage and defeat the front armor of most TL10- main battle tanks (and most TL14- light vehicles). Can also engage aircraft. Range: 100m-8000m. Treat as HEAT RAM Grenade +9 for target; HE RAM grenade +3 for fragmentation.

TL12 Light AV Missile “Pilum”. A lightweight, close range missile system. Weighs 10kg; costs Cr20,000. A brilliant, fire and forget weapon designed to engage and defeat the front armor of most TL12- main battle tanks (and most TL14- light vehicles). Can also engage aircraft. Range: 20m-1300. Treat as HEAT RAM Grenade +10 for target; HE RAM grenade +4 for fragmentation.

TL12 Medium AV Missile “Mamba”. A medium range manportable missile system. Weighs 20kg; costs Cr40,000. A brilliant, fire and forget weapon designed to engage and defeat the front armor of most TL12- main battle tanks (and most TL15- light vehicles). Can also engage aircraft. Range: 70m-2000m. Treat as HEAT RAM Grenade +10 for target; HE RAM grenade +4 for fragmentation.

TL12 Heavy AV Missile “Samson”. A heavy, long range missile system. Weighs 40kg; costs Cr75,000. A brilliant, fire and forget weapon designed to engage and defeat the front armor of most TL12- main battle tanks (and most TL15- light vehicles). Can also engage aircraft. Range: 100m-8000m. Treat as HEAT RAM Grenade +11 for target; HE RAM grenade +4 for fragmentation.

TV-12C Greyhawk Light Tiltrotor Transport: TL11 Titrotor transport, capable of carrying 16 fully equipped troops and associated equipment or 10 metric tons of equipment. Cruising speed 500 km/hr; maximum speed 600 km/hr. Fusion powered; consumes 2.5L fuel per hour. Fuel capacity is 100L, which theoretically allows 40 hours of flight. Crew and airframe endurance issues limit endurance on tactical missions to around 12 hours. Effective combat radius 2000 km. Maximum ferry range is 20,000km. Armor equivalent to Combat Armor -2 (i.e., better than regular combat armor). Armament—chin mounted HMG. Has 2 hardpoints to attach missile pods, gun/rocket pods, rocket pods or gun pods. Rear door-mounted HMG is often carried. 2 Crew, plus door gunner.

TV-8D Condor Medium Tiltrotor Transport: TL11 Titrotor transport, capable of carrying 36 fully equipped troops and associated equipment or 22 metric tons of equipment. Cruising speed 500 km/hr; maximum speed 600 km/hr. Fusion powered; consumes 5L fuel per hour. Fuel capacity is 200L, which theoretically allows 40 hours of flight. Crew and airframe endurance issues limit endurance on tactical missions to around 18 hours. Effective combat radius 3000 km. Maximum ferry range is 20,000km. Armor equivalent to Combat Armor -2 (i.e., better than regular combat armor). Armament—chin mounted HMG. Has 2 hardpoints to attach missile pods, gun/rocket pods, rocket pods or gun pods. Rear door-mounted HMG is often carried. 3 crew, plus door gunner.

AV-22Viper Gunship: TL11 Tiltrotor gunship. Cruising speed 750 km/hr; maximum speed 900 km/hr. Fusion powered; consumes 5L fuel per hour. Fuel capacity is 200L, which theoretically allows 40 hours of flight. Crew and airframe endurance issues limit endurance on tactical missions to around 12hours. Effective combat radius 3000 km. Maximum ferry range is 30,000km. Armor equivalent to Combat Armor -3 (i.e., better than regular combat armor). Armament—chin mounted VRF Gauss Gun with 35,000 rounds. Has 4 hardpoints to attach missile pods, rocket pods or gun pods. 2 Crew.

OV-11E Bronco Light Observation Tiltrotor: TL11 tiltrotor. Cruising speed 750km/hr., maximum speed 900 km/hr. Fusion powered; consumes 2L fuel per hour. Fuel capacity is 80L, which theoretically allows 40 hours of flight. Crew and airframe endurance issues limit endurance on tactical missions to around 12hours. Effective combat radius 3000 km. Maximum ferry range is 30,000km. Armor equivalent to Combat Armor -1 (i.e., better than regular combat armor). Armament—chin mounted VRF Gauss Gun with 35,000 rounds. Has 2 hardpoints to attach missile pods, rocket pods or gun pods. 2 Crew.

Rocket Pods have an effective range of 5km and act like a light mortar with an ROF of up to 24.

Missile Pods have 4 heavy missiles.

Gun Pods have twin HMGs.

 

[tbeard1999]

Task Organization; Regimental System

Task Organization

The Commonwealth Army ferociously task organizes. It is common for individual battalion commanders to cross-attach elements from various units into 5 company-sized combat teams (and for team commanders to do the same to their subordinate units). A sample unit might look like this:
(See PDF)

This force has been designed for an infantry assault. 1st and 2nd platoons are intended to lay down heavy fire on the objective, using most of the company’s long range direct fire weapons. 3rd and 4th platoons are the company assault force. Using all of the company’s infantry and LMG assets, their mission is to close with the enemy. All of the company’s mortars are under the direct command of the company commander. 5th Platoon is airmobile and is designed to outflank enemy positions, quickly sieze key objectives, etc.

Typical Attachments

Typical attachments to an infantry brigade (from brigade level assets) include:
1 x Combat Engineer Platoon (42)
1 x Field Artillery Battery or 1 x MRL Battery, usually with a Heavy Lift Element (4 x TV-5G/H Gryphon Tiltrotor Transports)
1 x Armored Platoon or Mechanized Infantry Platoon
1 x SAS Squad, sometimes with 1 x TV-12C Greyhawk Light Tiltrotor Transport

(See PDF for more detail).

Commonwealth Regimental System

The Commonwealth uses a regimental system similar to that used by the 19th century British Army. Each battalion belongs to a particular regiment. Regiments are generally not tactical units, but rather are the “parent” formations of a number of battalions. For combat operations, battalions from various regiments may be grouped into brigades.

Each regiment is responsible for recruiting, training, and administration; the regiment is permanently maintained and therefore it will develop a unique esprit de corps from its history, traditions, recruitment, and function. The regiment is responsible for recruiting and basic training. A soldier will typically remain in the same regiment for his entire career.

Currently, most Commonwealth regiments have 2-4 battalions, plus a recruiting/training depot. Regiments may contain units from all combat arms. For instance, the 155th Mississippi Rifles Infantry Regiment contains 3 infantry battalions, which include artillery, light armor and air cavalry sub-units.

Regiments often form friendships (and animosities) with other regiments. Thoughtful staff officers try to brigade battalions from friendly regiments and avoid mixing battalions from regiments with “bad blood”.

Many regiments were given the names and tradition of US, British, Japanese and Australian regiments (i.e., the “Black Watch Regiment). Some attempt was made to match traditions with role. Thus, drop infantry battalions come from regiments with the traditions of Terran airborne regiments, marine battalions come from regiments with the traditions of the US Marine Corps, etc.

Other regiments use the geographic designation from their recruiting area (the 2nd Haven Rifles). Sepoy regiments (regiments of native troops) are typically given a numerical designation and a geographic/ethnic designation (3rd Pravan Rifles).

The benefits of the regimental system are significant – superior cohesion, esprit de corps, etc. Drawbacks include hazardous regimental competition, a lack of interchangeability between units of different regiments, and more pronounced "old boy networks" within the military that may hamper efficiency and fairness.

Within the regimental system, soldiers are always posted to a tactical unit of their own regiment whenever posted to field duty. In addition to combat units, other organizations are very much part of the regimental family: regimental training schools, serving members on “extra-regimental employment”, regimental associations (retirees), bands and associated cadet groups. The aspects that an administrative regiment might have in common include a symbolic colonel-in-chief (often a member of the royal family), a colonel of the regiment or "honorary colonel" who protects the traditions and interests of the regimental family and insists on the maintenance of high standards, battle honors (honors earned by one unit of an administrative regiment are shared by the whole regiment), ceremonial uniforms, cap badges, peculiarities of insignia, stable belts, and regimental marches and songs. The regiment usually has a traditional “home station”, which is often a historic garrison that houses the regimental museum and regimental headquarters. The latter has a modest staff to support regimental committees and administer both the regular members and the association(s) of retired members. Many regiments have financed ventures to Terra to recover regimental artifacts and trophies. (This will be an adventure hook at some point...an expedition to Terra to recover certain regimental artifacts of the 155th Mississippi Rifles).

 

[Prometheus]

Task Organization

The Commonwealth Army ferociously task organizes. It is common for individual battalion commanders to cross-attach elements from various units into 5 company-sized combat teams (and for team commanders to do the same to their subordinate units). A sample unit might look like this:
(See PDF)

This force has been designed for an infantry assault. 1st and 2nd platoons are intended to lay down heavy fire on the objective, using most of the company’s long range direct fire weapons. 3rd and 4th platoons are the company assault force. Using all of the company’s infantry and LMG assets, their mission is to close with the enemy. All of the company’s mortars are under the direct command of the company commander. 5th Platoon is airmobile and is designed to outflank enemy positions, quickly sieze key objectives, etc.

Typical Attachments

Typical attachments to an infantry brigade (from brigade level assets) include:
1 x Combat Engineer Platoon (42)
1 x Field Artillery Battery or 1 x MRL Battery, usually with a Heavy Lift Element (4 x TV-5G/H Gryphon Tiltrotor Transports)
1 x Armored Platoon or Mechanized Infantry Platoon
1 x SAS Squad, sometimes with 1 x TV-12C Greyhawk Light Tiltrotor Transport

(See PDF for more detail).

Commonwealth Regimental System

The Commonwealth uses a regimental system similar to that used by the 19th century British Army. Each battalion belongs to a particular regiment. Regiments are generally not tactical units, but rather are the “parent” formations of a number of battalions. For combat operations, battalions from various regiments may be grouped into brigades.

Each regiment is responsible for recruiting, training, and administration; the regiment is permanently maintained and therefore it will develop a unique esprit de corps from its history, traditions, recruitment, and function. The regiment is responsible for recruiting and basic training. A soldier will typically remain in the same regiment for his entire career.

Currently, most Commonwealth regiments have 2-4 battalions, plus a recruiting/training depot. Regiments may contain units from all combat arms. For instance, the 155th Mississippi Rifles Infantry Regiment contains 3 infantry battalions, which include artillery, light armor and air cavalry sub-units.

Regiments often form friendships (and animosities) with other regiments. Thoughtful staff officers try to brigade battalions from friendly regiments and avoid mixing battalions from regiments with “bad blood”.

Many regiments were given the names and tradition of US, British, Japanese and Australian regiments (i.e., the “Black Watch Regiment). Some attempt was made to match traditions with role. Thus, drop infantry battalions come from regiments with the traditions of Terran airborne regiments, marine battalions come from regiments with the traditions of the US Marine Corps, etc.

Other regiments use the geographic designation from their recruiting area (the 2nd Haven Rifles). Sepoy regiments (regiments of native troops) are typically given a numerical designation and a geographic/ethnic designation (3rd Pravan Rifles).

The benefits of the regimental system are significant – superior cohesion, esprit de corps, etc. Drawbacks include hazardous regimental competition, a lack of interchangeability between units of different regiments, and more pronounced "old boy networks" within the military that may hamper efficiency and fairness.

Within the regimental system, soldiers are always posted to a tactical unit of their own regiment whenever posted to field duty. In addition to combat units, other organizations are very much part of the regimental family: regimental training schools, serving members on “extra-regimental employment”, regimental associations (retirees), bands and associated cadet groups. The aspects that an administrative regiment might have in common include a symbolic colonel-in-chief (often a member of the royal family), a colonel of the regiment or "honorary colonel" who protects the traditions and interests of the regimental family and insists on the maintenance of high standards, battle honors (honors earned by one unit of an administrative regiment are shared by the whole regiment), ceremonial uniforms, cap badges, peculiarities of insignia, stable belts, and regimental marches and songs. The regiment usually has a traditional “home station”, which is often a historic garrison that houses the regimental museum and regimental headquarters. The latter has a modest staff to support regimental committees and administer both the regular members and the association(s) of retired members. Many regiments have financed ventures to Terra to recover regimental artifacts and trophies. (This will be an adventure hook at some point...an expedition to Terra to recover certain regimental artifacts of the 155th Mississippi Rifles).

I find the last paragraph very appealing due to the Terran sense of tradition. You may want to examine the Air-Mech Strike Book that came out in the early 2000. It address many of the issues I see you wrestling with. I think the EW and Net warfare issue needs to be re-exaimined and put it more in a 3-D. I agree that the units need to be small for portability and lethality is a must. The Unit of action modular approach and the French present order of battle can be good references as well. In the end good work and best wishes.

 

[tbeard1999]

I find the last paragraph very appealing due to the Terran sense of tradition. You may want to examine the Air-Mech Strike Book that came out in the early 2000. It address many of the issues I see you wrestling with. I think the EW and Net warfare issue needs to be re-exaimined and put it more in a 3-D. I agree that the units need to be small for portability and lethality is a must. The Unit of action modular approach and the French present order of battle can be good references as well. In the end good work and best wishes.

I've been monitoring the air mechanization theorists since I became aware of them in the late 1990s. For normal folks, the air-mech theorists want to develop airmobile medium and heavy weight forces that can be inserted into enemy rear areas. So instead of the 101st Air Assault division's light infantry, you might have a brigade of M1A2 tanks with Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Their arguments are persuasive, but the cost to develop airlift for such a unit is formidable. An M1A2 Abrams MBT weighs over 60 tonnes, while the Bradley weighs 25-30 tonnes. The lighter armored Stryker weighs about 17 tonnes. For comparison, the CH-53 heavy lift helicopter has a capacity of ~15 tonnes. The C-130 can carry about 20 tonnes, and there is a vertical lift variant described in Popular Mechanics in 2003. However, the conversion equipment is likely to decrease the C-130's cargo capacity.

And once you insert a heavy mechanized force, you have to keep it supplied. A full load of fuel and ammo for each M1 is about 1.5 tons for the ammo and 2 tons for the fuel (which works out to about 8 hours of cross country movement). So the challenges are formidable (i.e., extremely expensive).

The Commonwealth Army is an "imperial" Army in the sense that its forces are widely scattered across a large colonial empire. While it does have some heavy armored and mechanized forces, most of the army is composed of light infantry. And most of that is airmobile. This allows relatively small units to police very large areas.

The advent of fusion power plants makes vehicle range a function of habitability and mechanical stresses on the vehicle components. So, a Commonwealth airmobile infantry battalion can self deploy up to 2000km in 6-8 hours (assuming 2-4 hours loading time).** This allows a single battalion to police an area that would have required several 20th century army groups. And in emergencies, the battalion could ferry itself as far as 20,000 km. It is not unusual for the Commonwealth to deploy a battalion of airmobile infantry to provide security for an entire continent the size of North America.*

By comparison, the modern UH-60 has a range of ~600 km and a ferry range of ~2200 km. This means that a modern airmobile battalion can cover only 7% of the area that its Commonwealth equivalent can.

Regarding EW and the like, my assumption is that by TL13+, data processing capabilities will be robust and built into everything. Few specialized troops are required to operate and maintain it, since it's ubiquitous and familiar to everyone.

*This flexibility is important, but at the end of the day, it's still only a battalion sized force. Astute enemy commanders will often launch multiple simultaneous operations to overstretch the Commonwealth units. The Commonwealth maintains significant numbers of Sepoy units to provide regional defensive capability. These units are organized and equipped similarly to reserve Commonwealth units, with a much small proportion of airmobile troops. Many Sepoy units are light mechanized -- i.e., they ride hovertrucks, light APCs, etc. In very primitive areas, Sepoy battalions may actually be mounted on the local equivalent of horses (these units are often called "Dragoons").

**Actually, only about 40% of the battalion can be transported in a single lift, so it will take 3 lifts to move the entire unit. Still, the entire battalion is deployable at intercontinental ranges within 12-18 hours. And it can deploy company sized assault teams anywhere on a Terra-sized world within about 30 hours.

 

[Prometheus]

I've been monitoring the air mechanization theorists since I became aware of them in the late 1990s. For normal folks, the air-mech theorists want to develop airmobile medium and heavy weight forces that can be inserted into enemy rear areas. So instead of the 101st Air Assault division's light infantry, you might have a brigade of M1A2 tanks with Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Their arguments are persuasive, but the cost to develop airlift for such a unit is formidable. An M1A2 Abrams MBT weighs over 60 tonnes, while the Bradley weighs 25-30 tonnes. The lighter armored Stryker weighs about 17 tonnes. For comparison, the CH-53 heavy lift helicopter has a capacity of ~15 tonnes. The C-130 can carry about 20 tonnes, and there is a vertical lift variant described in Popular Mechanics in 2003. However, the conversion equipment is likely to decrease the C-130's cargo capacity.

And once you insert a heavy mechanized force, you have to keep it supplied. A full load of fuel and ammo for each M1 is about 1.5 tons for the ammo and 2 tons for the fuel (which works out to about 8 hours of cross country movement). So the challenges are formidable (i.e., extremely expensive).

===== Break=======

The advent of fusion power plants makes vehicle range a function of habitability and mechanical stresses on the vehicle components. So, a Commonwealth airmobile infantry battalion can self deploy up to 2000km in 6-8 hours (assuming 2-4 hours loading time).** This allows a single battalion to police an area that would have required several 20th century army groups. And in emergencies, the battalion could ferry itself as far as 20,000 km. It is not unusual for the Commonwealth to deploy a battalion of airmobile infantry to provide security for an entire continent the size of North America.*

By comparison, the modern UH-60 has a range of ~600 km and a ferry range of ~2200 km. This means that a modern airmobile battalion can cover only 7% of the area that its Commonwealth equivalent can.

Regarding EW and the like, my assumption is that by TL13+, data processing capabilities will be robust and built into everything. Few specialized troops are required to operate and maintain it, since it's ubiquitous and familiar to everyone.

*This flexibility is important, but at the end of the day, it's still only a battalion sized force. Astute enemy commanders will often launch multiple simultaneous operations to overstretch the Commonwealth units. The Commonwealth maintains significant numbers of Sepoy units to provide regional defensive capability. These units are organized and equipped similarly to reserve Commonwealth units, with a much small proportion of airmobile troops. Many Sepoy units are light mechanized -- i.e., they ride hovertrucks, light APCs, etc. In very primitive areas, Sepoy battalions may actually be mounted on the local equivalent of horses (these units are often called "Dragoons").

**Actually, only about 40% of the battalion can be transported in a single lift, so it will take 3 lifts to move the entire unit. Still, the entire battalion is deployable at intercontinental ranges within 12-18 hours. And it can deploy company sized assault teams anywhere on a Terra-sized world within about 30 hours.

Having been on the sharp end of the the stick... (Afghanistan x2) the concept of a small force covering a large battle space... it doesn't really work all to well. Our Parachute battalion was assigned a battle space the size of Sicily and the ACM dominated many sections of it. Also as high tech as you get your still suffer the GI Proof clause in all technology.. everything breaks under operational demands and rugged Enviroments.

I do agree that the Logistics foot print of a modern era mech force is staggering. But you brought a very powerful pointy you bring to bear is the fusion power plant. That is quite liberating piece of technology.

Going back to the EW issue and Net Centric C7I... it is always vunerable. TL 13 Mcauffie Virus protection means there is a TL 13 Hacker out there who can break it, jam it and defeat it.
The Air-Mech-Strike book I was pointing out was the Weapons System and Delivery system where never designed in sympatico. Something I think that current theorist ans projection experts forget to take into account of.

Your turn-

 

[tbeard1999]

Having been on the sharp end of the the stick... (Afghanistan x2) the concept of a small force covering a large battle space... it doesn't really work all to well. Our Parachute battalion was assigned a battle space the size of Sicily and the ACM dominated many sections of it. Also as high tech as you get your still suffer the GI Proof clause in all technology.. everything breaks under operational demands and rugged Enviroments.

Of course, that's what makes the Traveller campaign interesting. The Commonwealth Army would be the first to agree that it is stretched almost absurdly thin. And colonial troops don't really fill in the gaps.

But the Commonwealth is a democratic, free market entity that emphasizes economic growth (it's main opponent is less technologically well developed, but has about 10x the population). So successive governments tend to starve the military to keep taxes low.

The Commonwealth Army tries to make the best of things by leveraging its superior technology, especially in two areas -- information acquisition and firepower generation. A Commonwealth unit literally swarms with RPV drones, so it is very unlikely that the enemy will achieve operational or strategic surprise. (In the main world of my campaign, various environmental factors conspire to limit this advantage). Even tactical surprise is challenging when satellites provide instantaneous real time reconnaisance to individual soldiers.

And once an enemy is identified, the Commonwealth Army can generate a staggering amount of firepower to destroy that enemy. Even a "light" infantry formation like the airmobile battalion can generate 5-10 times the firepower of an early 21st century US infantry battalion (and the US does firepower better than anyone else). From individual gauss rifles (firing ammo that weighs 1/4 what 20th century combat rifle ammo weights) to VRF gauss guns, to 15cm rocket howitzers firing brilliant cluster bomblet munitions, to gunships mounting VRF gauss guns, the Commonwealth Army literally bristles with firepower.

But you're absolutely right...a single battalion will be hard pressed to secure a continent, no matter how mobile and how lavishly equipped it is. Still, professional soldiers perform the missions they're assigned to the best of their ability, no matter how much the missions may strain their capabilities.

Like I said...there's the drama for the campaign.

"For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the brute!'

"But it's 'Saviour of 'is country," when the guns begin to shoot..."


Kipling would be right at home in the Commonwealth...

I do agree that the Logistics foot print of a modern era mech force is staggering. But you brought a very powerful pointy you bring to bear is the fusion power plant. That is quite liberating piece of technology.

At the very least, it makes fuel a virtual non-issue. It also makes aircraft far more capable and robust. On a small transport aircraft, the fuel savings alone would enable the craft to carry 1-2 tons more. Add in the superior horsepower to weight ratio of fusion drives and this means that Commonwealth aircraft can carry a lot more (a lot farther) than their 21st century Terran counterparts.

Going back to the EW issue and Net Centric C7I... it is always vunerable. TL 13 Mcauffie Virus protection means there is a TL 13 Hacker out there who can break it, jam it and defeat it.

I guess my position is that this is pretty much "built-in" by TL13. BY that time, computers will be in *everything* and will be no more remarkable than lightbulbs are today.

IMHO, the high cost of interstellar transport means that a premium will be placed on reliability and durability. In addition, the Commonwealth is the most technologically advanced entity in my campaign. So Commonwealth tech can afford to sacrifice cutting edge performance for superior reliability and durability.

So in my campaign, the Commonwealth stuff generally works well and holds up well. Plus, the "high tech armies being beaten by low tech opponents" cliche has been done to death. And really...can anyone even go there after it was so effectively lampooned by the Ewoks in Return of the Jedi?

IN my campaign, the Commonwealth military is a professional, competent organization. Its officers and men are not stupid (well, most aren't). The junior officer corps is aggressive and maybe a little too enthusiastic (much like the 19th century British army junior officer corps), but again, they aren't idiots. They do not overly rely on technology. With the scores of worlds occupied by Commonwealth forces, every piece of gear has been defeated by at least one environment. If the technology is helpful, they use it. If it breaks, they do it the old fashioned way (the standard infantry rifles still have bayonet lugs and a very good quality bayonet for good reason).

They can be beaten, but only by resourceful enemies who attack the Commonwealth Army's weaknesses and find ways to avoid its strengths.

The Air-Mech-Strike book I was pointing out was the Weapons System and Delivery system where never designed in sympatico. Something I think that current theorist ans projection experts forget to take into account of.

Agreed. You can't make a 60t M-1 airmobile with helicopters than can only carry 20 tons. And while the 30-40t Future Combat System is the panacea that *everyone* is expecting, they'll be disappointed I fear.

There's a reason that main battle tanks weigh 60 tons these days -- the armor package required to (incompletely) protect them from common threats.

The only way that a 30 ton tank will match a 60 ton tank in protection will be if the 30 ton tank has armor that has several times more mass efficiency than the competition. And while materials science may well deliver armor that is 2-3 times more effective by mass than current armor, there's little reason to assume that only the US will have that technology. We probably will have some edge in armor tech for the forseeable future, but I do not imagine that it could possibly be 2-3 times greater for very long.

And the minute the enemy has armor tech roughly as capable as ours, the FCS becomes a poorly armored light tank.

So...IMHO the only way a plausible heavy mech force can be made airmobile is to build helicopters/tiltrotors capable of carrying 60 ton MBTs. Such aircraft will be very expensive (as much as $100-200 million each, assuming that costs scale with capacity). 60 such aircraft will be required to deliver the combat elements of an armored battalion. So a brigade sized force would require roughly three times as many aircraft. In perspective, this would be more than the total number of C5A transports the US currently has.

Now, I happen to think it would be a *very* useful capability in a mechanized war. But I just don't see the Army spending that kind of money on a single brigade, much less a whole division.

 

[sabredog]

So...IMHO the only way a plausible heavy mech force can be made airmobile is to build helicopters/tiltrotors capable of carrying 60 ton MBTs. Such aircraft will be very expensive (as much as $100-200 million each, assuming that costs scale with capacity). 60 such aircraft will be required to deliver the combat elements of an armored battalion. So a brigade sized force would require roughly three times as many aircraft. In perspective, this would be more than the total number of C5A transports the US currently has.

Now, I happen to think it would be a *very* useful capability in a mechanized war. But I just don't see the Army spending that kind of money on a single brigade, much less a whole division.

I might be going out on a limb here, but what about an armor force organized around the idea of say 1 platoon of MBTs forming the core of 4 platoons of lighter fast mover armor capable of engaging MBT's not toe-to-toe, but by using tank-killing weapons combined with speed, accuracy, and manuever. Like the old tank destroyer tactics of WW2. Something like enhanced Rooikats or Stryker M1128 MGS with hypervelocity railguns and tac missiles that can be launched from cover and guided in by scout infantry or RPV's?

The heavies can be used for direct confrontation of opposing MBT's or as the support force of a direct assault, the lighter armor would be armored well enough for better than average protection against ATGM's and some direct fire. This can be enhanced by various anti-ATGM and cannon round systems available even today but much improved by TL.

For instance, something like Metal Storm mounted on a couple remote pods and directed by laser detection and tracking systems. The systems scan for incoming rounds and missile, then let loose a volley to intercept. Granted that won't work every time, but something like that (the Russians use something similar today on the T-90+, along with flexible aromor plating for deflecting the impact of direct fire AT rounds) would be a protection multiplier that could give the edge to the light tanks.

The heavies could be tracked or blowers, the lights could be fast wheeled or blowers as well, the faster the better since speed would indeed mean life for them if they get caught out in the open by an MBT. But I would think a platoon of "brilliant" missile launching, hypervelocity railgun firing light tanks could do a lot of damage to heavy, slower MBTs which would not be able to take advantage of cover. Especially when the sky is full of RPV's guiding in the missiles.

It's at least add some dash to cavalry regiments.

 

[sabredog]

Here's an interesting link that discusses all the Stryker variants that include even an SP Howitzer version. The modular design might be useful to consider as support for your forces.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav-mgs.htm

 

[tbeard1999]

Here's an interesting link that discusses all the Stryker variants that include even an SP Howitzer version. The modular design might be useful to consider as support for your forces.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav-mgs.htm

I guess great minds think alike

The Commonwealth Marines (which are medium weight forces) and some Sepoy and Company units use the LAV-40, which is a fusion powered Stryker (with the serial numbers filed off) with TL13 armor and weaponry. Like the Stryker, the LAV-40 has a variety of variants.

Most Commonwealth infantry units are either airmobile or jump infantry. There are a few armored battalions and mechanized battalions that use Dragoon class hovercraft IFV's for mechanized infantry. A few reserve mechanized battalions use the Hoplite IFV, which is a 60 ton infantry fighting vehicle based on the same chasis as the Lancer MBT.

 

[tbeard1999]

I might be going out on a limb here, but what about an armor force organized around the idea of say 1 platoon of MBTs forming the core of 4 platoons of lighter fast mover armor capable of engaging MBT's not toe-to-toe, but by using tank-killing weapons combined with speed, accuracy, and manuever. Like the old tank destroyer tactics of WW2. Something like enhanced Rooikats or Stryker M1128 MGS with hypervelocity railguns and tac missiles that can be launched from cover and guided in by scout infantry or RPV's?

IMHO, the main challenge in deploying heavy mechanized airmobile forces is the requirement for heavy lift air transport.

Even the Stryker is too heavy for any current heavy lift helicopters, so a Real World force like you describe will require a generation of transport aircraft that does not exist. (Again, I'm intrigued at the potential of such a force; I just don't see the US Army spending the kind of money that would be required to develop such a capability).

In the OTU, such a capability is achieved with contrgrav technology.

In my campaign, which lacks contragrav, the Commonwealth has a similar problem to the modern US military--it's a very expensive capability to develop. The difference is that the Commonwealth has access to TL13-14 materials tech and fusion power plants (plus an economic base at least 20 times that of the USA circa 2009). So there are medium and heavy air mechanized battalions in the Commonwealth order of battle. These forces tend to be based in the Core, though, and aren't much used on colonial planets.

 

[sabredog]

IMHO, the main challenge in deploying heavy mechanized airmobile forces is the requirement for heavy lift air transport.

Even the Stryker is too heavy for any current heavy lift helicopters, so a Real World force like you describe will require a generation of transport aircraft that does not exist. (Again, I'm intrigued at the potential of such a force; I just don't see the US Army spending the kind of money that would be required to develop such a capability).

In the OTU, such a capability is achieved with contrgrav technology.

In my campaign, which lacks contragrav, the Commonwealth has a similar problem to the modern US military--it's a very expensive capability to develop. The difference is that the Commonwealth has access to TL13-14 materials tech and fusion power plants (plus an economic base at least 20 times that of the USA circa 2009). So there are medium and heavy air mechanized battalions in the Commonwealth order of battle. These forces tend to be based in the Core, though, and aren't much used on colonial planets.

Thats is the core problem with modern forces, that long tail and how to get the long battleships out there to the fight. So, if the landers (since they'd have to come down from orbit somehow, can't get them close to the fight, couldn't they use some large ACV bulk carrier? Trains? What about the landing craft from the Marine ships themselves being able to carry the heavies close to the lines?

But otherwise, I imagine your regular troops have to rely as heavily on colonials and sepoy units as the British did in the the days of the Raj and the NW Frontier conflicts. Good officers leading a regular unit supported heavily by local irregulars chronically under-armed, under-manned, and against desperate odds. Thank heaven for the Maxim gun (er, VRFGG)!

BTW: who do they fight out there anyway that they would need heavier armor support?

 

[tbeard1999]

Thats is the core problem with modern forces, that long tail and how to get the long battleships out there to the fight. So, if the landers (since they'd have to come down from orbit somehow, can't get them close to the fight, couldn't they use some large ACV bulk carrier? Trains? What about the landing craft from the Marine ships themselves being able to carry the heavies close to the lines?

Seems to me that an airmobile heavy mech force will need to be transported into enemy rear areas. Therefore, the transports will need to be survivable in a combat environment (or well-escorted). And of course, the transports will need to be very large to carry 60 ton MBTs and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (think of tiltrotors the size and capacity of a C5A).

Generally, I do not consider starships to be inherently survivable in atmospheric operations. This, BTW, is a change from Traveller canon. OTU civilian starships have three times the armor protection of an M1A2 MBT -- equivalent to 1.9 meters of hard steel armor.

Here is my idea of how a Commonwealth Marine landing would go. This is a Marine Expeditionary Group (a heavily augumented company sized battlegroup). Here is the Army version of a rapid deployment force, the Winters class Mobile Infantry Drop Transport (capable of landing and supporting a battalion of light infantry).

And in my campaign, most starships have to land at starports. I haven't actually defined why this is (suggestions are welcome), but it is a dramatically desirable requirement. It means that planetary invasions center around capturing starports (or very large airports, I suppose). More accurately, the followup forces after the jump troops and marines land require starports.

But otherwise, I imagine your regular troops have to rely as heavily on colonials and sepoy units as the British did in the the days of the Raj and the NW Frontier conflicts. Good officers leading a regular unit supported heavily by local irregulars chronically under-armed, under-manned, and against desperate odds. Thank heaven for the Maxim gun (er, VRFGG)!

Yep, pretty much. The Development Companies (analogous to the East India Trading Company) have "company armies" which are raised by the Company, but officered by regular Army officers and (some) NCOs. And the Companies also have Sepoy units. Mercenary forces exist and are often hired by Companies or colonies.

BTW: who do they fight out there anyway that they would need heavier armor support?

There is a very large state, the Caliphate, that controls Terra and surrounding systems. The Caliphate has a much larger population, but is technologically backwards. There's been no major war in the last 100 years, but numerous skirmishes. Like the Ottomans in their decline, the Caliphate can't always keep individual Beys or Deys from launching jihads against the infidels of the Commonwealth. These tend to be raids, however, rather than set piece battles. But there's always a chance that a Commonwealth punitive expedition might escalate into full scale war.*

There are several minor powers (and a strengthening independence movement in one section of the Rim) that are pretty advanced as well.

But 90% of the army is policing hundreds of colonies, typically populated by primitive and savage aliens.

So it's the threat of a large war that leads the Commonwealth Army to maintain a small core of heavy forces. But these are ill-suited for colonial duty and are very costly to maintain in frontier settings. So they aren't seen much in the frontier areas. And as the Commonwealth military is perenially under-funded, the expensive heavy forces tend to receive disproportionate attention from budget cutters.

*Behind the scenes info -- there's little chance that the Caliphate could defeat the Commonwealth militarily. The Commonwealth is more advanced, far better organized and quite simply *far better* at fighting organized campaigns. The Caliphate is particularly weak on logistics, so a war at the end of a 70 parsec supply line is probably beyond their capabilities.

The Commonwealth, for its part, has no particular desire (or need) to conquer the Caliphate. In any case, Terra lies >70 parsecs from the Core Commonwealth systems, and the Commonwealth has expanded almost entirely in the opposite direction. So a Commonwealth military campaign to Terra would be extremely costly in financial terms. That said, the Caliph does not have complete control of his subordinates. So while he's a relatively benign ruler, some of his subordinates are not. Some of them are outright fanatics who consider it a religious duty to annihilate the infidels. Exacerbating this is the fact that the Caliph (and his predecessors) like to post dangerous subordinates near the Commonwealth and subtlely encourage them to attack the Commonwealth. This tends to get rid of them, but there's always a danger that they'll do something that will spark a general war...

The Commonwealth has has an equally shortsighted policy of "proportionate response", bribing troublesome Beys or Deys and ignoring smaller provocations. Successive Commonwealth governments (of all parties) have failed utterly to understand that the Caliphate tends to interpret restraint as cowardice. Thus, Caliphate incursions have grown bolder over time. But wars are very expensive, you see, and the Commonwealth is reluctant to do anything that is too expensive...

In other words, miscalculation will be the most likely cause of a general war.

And given that neither side really has a military that is suitable for such a war, it would be a very *interesting* fight.

 

[sabredog]

Generally, I do not consider starships to be inherently survivable in atmospheric operations. This, BTW, is a change from Traveller canon. OTU civilian starships have three times the armor protection of an M1A2 MBT -- equivalent to 1.9 meters of hard steel armor.


And in my campaign, most starships have to land at starports. I haven't actually defined why this is (suggestions are welcome), but it is a dramatically desirable requirement. It means that planetary invasions center around capturing starports (or very large airports, I suppose). More accurately, the followup forces after the jump troops and marines land require starports.

IMTU I also don't assume Trav ships to be very useful in landing ops either, except for heavily armored and fast non-starships specially built for the task. They only hold a platoon of Marines (55 IMTU). And the ones carrying tanks can't realistically land close enough to active fire to make them useful until the LZ's are secured. Both types are coming in as fast as possible while throwing out chaff, decoys, flares, and the jammers screaming like crazy. Needless to say unless the LZ has been well prepped by ortillery and gunships it's a hairy ride for the Line Marines, but that's what they get paid for (and the bagpipes playing loudly over the suit comms help boost morale on the way down). The Drop Troops are far fewer than they sound like they are in the OTU, I just consider them the equivalent of the SAS or SEALs.

The lower tech colonial fleet troops have it worse, since they can't rely on 250kt battleships pounding the enemy with meson batteries and missile carriers pasting the LZ with a walking time on target barrage seconds before the landers touch down (Imperial tactical doctrine IMTU calls for "leaning into the barrage" with friendly fire casualties within reason being part of the price of doing business).

No, the Colonial Marines come down in section-carrying landers that double as gunships - and it's pretty rough. Contra-grav is available, but limited because of the expense and difficulty of maintaining it out where the average TL might be 10, but local manufacturing is dependent on imports from the Terran Empire. So no battlesuits, FGMPs are squad support weapons, and the Gauss Rifle is king.

Colonial ACV blowers (the MkVII LuftkissenPanzerkampfWagen, or "Lucky-7" from Friedland) are only 40tons and armed with pulse gatling lasers and hypervelocity autocannons but could in no way match a 80 ton M-8b Bulldog grav MBT the Imperials use. But the Lucky's are more than enough to support the troopers fighting some backwater insurrection. But mainly they rely on fast wheeled vehicles that look not too different from things like Rooikats and Strykers.

As for limiting starships to ports, I do the same for ships above 400 tons. I figure that anything bigger might just crack in half if the pad isn't there to support it. I don't allow anything above 3000ton to land at all. Contra-grav or no, that's a lot of mass punching through the atmosphere. Might break too many windows in town and tick off the locals. And it gives the players an excuse to use the ship's small craft, and me a chance to see what they do if they get stranded on a world when the cutter blows a fuse (or gets stolen as in one adventure).

 

[sabredog]

IMTU the Colonials and assorted similarly equipped merc forces are the usual threat for PC's if they are playing in that sort of campaign or adventure since almost all of my campaign has taken place out in the assorted colony worlds and coalitions that form a DMZ of sorts between the two major powers. And that area of several subsectors is also a small ship universe. The Imperial powers only get directly involved if Something Big is brewing.

So if the players see a squadron of 50kt destroyers in orbit and battlesuited Line Marines landing they know it might be time to get out of town in a hurry.

 

[tbeard1999]

I have been enjoying most of the posts here on this thread.

tbeard,
A book that I pulled out to read that I thought you might find interesting

Men Against Fire by General S.L.A. Marshall

I say interesting because if you ingore the time frame that it was written in, you could swear that it was written in the last 10 years.

Dave Chase

Yeah, I've read it long ago. Marshall has done some good history, but his contention that most soldiers didn't fire in combat has been highly controversial. It's flatly contradicted by a great many combat soldiers and Marshall didn't document his evidence very well. Since I choose to believe the combat veterans (including some personal friends, great uncles, etc.). I'm kinda sour on him right now. But thanks for the recommendation.

 

[sabredog]

I agree on Marshall -the idea that most men merely fire in the general direction of the enemy, blindly, or not at all while in combat I find suspect - also based on my family members' recollections during WW2 and Viet Nam. Same with the guys at work who have been returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.

I think rather that he was one of those who fell in line with the people who believed if infantry were given automatic rifles they'd just shoot up all thier ammo in the general direction of the enemy and not use marksmanship.

Reminds me of that goofy "Battlefield Detectives" show. Especially the episodes on Pickett's Charge and Isandlewana where they "debunked myths" about the battles in spite of eyewitness accounts from both combatants and common sense. Ridiculous.

 

[sabredog]

Well, sorry to detract from your Airmobile thread. It just seemed similar in the reasons for having ground troops.

Every read the book 'How to make War'? I don't have it handy but I read that one and some of your thoughts on the various types of militarys sound like some things that I remember out of it.

Dave Chase

The reason to have ground troops is that some poor dogface has to dig in and physically keep the enemy from taking back the ground...or take it away from the other poor dogface and that might mean having to climb down in his hole and force him out at bayonet point. Or at the muzzle of an FGMP. And it'll always be that way as long as there is war.

Yeah, Dunnigan wrote that book, and a slew of similar titles. Interesting read, although at the time they came out they were wrong about some issues involving the practicality if IFV's, and anti-armor warfare. But that was probably because at the time we thought we'd be fighting the Red Army in Germany and Ivan's BMP's were the cat's pajamas while our own Bradley's were in massive cost overruns and sank when tested for amphibious ability (which was quickly discarded). The idea of IFV's being used as mini-tanks by their crews and unit commanders is like the one about soldiers not shooting back at the enemy - it flies in the face of common sense and training.

Still, Dunnigan did revise his book, and the others are pretty good.

 

[sabredog]

No, I do know that soldier will just fire in the general direction of the enemy in some individual circumstances- in less dramatic (scalewise) I know a lot of people will do that in even one on one combat. I am a firearms instructor for my agency and one of the reasons we train our officers so heavily in firearms tactics is so that training will kick in under stress and they will be able to shoot the threat and save their life, or another's, instead of just blindly blasting away.

Mind you, a lot of these guys are former military, too, and have already had training for combat en masse, not just one on one with handguns. Still, we see the same thing happen again and again, which seems to contradict Marshall's broader ideas - that training works to overcome the basic human instinct to not kill another. It overcomes fear, and it overcomes circumstances. And I see this just on the LE level, which is hardly the same level of training as the military gives.

Now, yes, some people will not perform as desired in combat...it's always an unknown as to what someone will really act like under those circumstances when it's "for real." But, from a lot of other-than-personal sources the picture seems to be that the vast majority of soldiers maintain a will to combat that directs them to at least try real hard to hit the enemy. They might not all be a Sgt York but they try under very difficult conditions to stop the threat. A few won't, some can't, but the majority do it right or why else would casualties increase dramatically (not deaths, just casualties) as weapons technology and training has improved over the years?

And I do take the word of others who have been there and written about it - I just stated my personal take on Marshal's opinion on the will to combat is all. The subject has come up ever since man stopped making muscle-powered warfare and picked up a rifle or musket, and as the stand-off to the enemy has increased with the accuracy of the weapons.

 

[tbeard1999]

I am a bit confused, sorry.

Are you saying that you don't believe that soldiers will or have just fired to be firing in the general direction of the enemy?

It's been a long time since I was a history grad student, so I can't recall the particulars. One of the key finding Marshall claimed to uncover was that ~75-85% of soldiers never fired a shot in a typical firefight:

In an average experienced infantry company in an average day's action, the number engaging with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per cent of the total strength. In the most aggressive companies, under the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 percent of the total strength from the opening to the close of the action.

IIRC, this claim was generally accepted by non-military historians, but came under increasing criticism by the 1970s and 1980s (when I was a history student). Seems that Marshall never really disclosed the evidence supporting his findings. And this claim has been hotly contested by combat veterans and historians who can find little evidence to support his assertion.

I note that the US Army's "Green Book" series makes no mention of this, nor do *any* of the credible memoirs I've read.

So I don't credit Marshall's claims.

Here's a quote from John Whiteclay Chambers, writing in the US Army War College journal Parameters that summarizes the criticisms of Marshall's claims.

It seems most probable that Marshall, writing as a journalist rather than as a historian, exaggerated the problem and arbitrarily decided on the one-quarter
figure because he believed that he needed a dramatic statistic to give added weight to his argument

The leading critic that I recall was Dr. Roger Spiller. I can't find his article on Marshall, but he edited Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, which I recently enjoyed.

EDIT: Found some quotes from Spiller's article ("SLA Marshall and the Ratio of Fire", The RUSI Journal, Winter 1988, pages 63-71):

Marshall had no use for the polite equivocations of scholarly discourse. His way of proving doubtful propositions was to state them more forcefully. Righteousness was always more important for Marshall than evidence....

The foundation of his conviction was not scholarship but his own military experience, experience that he inflated or revised as the situation warranted. Marshall often hinted broadly that he had commanded infantry in combat, but his service dossier shows no such service. He frequently held that he had been the youngest officer in the American Expeditionary Forces during the Great War, but this plays with the truth as well. Marshall enlisted in 1917 and served with the 315th Engineer Regiment—then part of the 90th Infantry Division—and won a commission after the Armistice, when rapid demobilization required very junior officers to command "casual" and depot companies as the veteran officers went home. Marshall rarely drew such distinctions, however, leaving his audiences to infer that he had commanded in the trenches. Later in life, he remarked that he had seen five wars as a soldier and 18 as a correspondent, but his definitions of war and soldiering were rather elastic. That he had seen a great deal of soldiers going about their deadly work was no empty boast, however. This mantle of experience, acquired in several guises, protected him throughout his long and prolific career as a military writer, and his aggressive style intimidated those who would doubt his arguments. Perhaps inevitably, his readers would mistake his certitude for authority.

...

In Men Against Fire Marshall claims to have interviewed "approximately" 400 infantry rifle companies in the Pacific and in Europe, but that number tended to change over the years. In 1952, the number had somehow grown to 603 companies; five years later his sample had declined to "something over 500" companies. Those infantry companies—whatever their actual number—were his laboratories, the infantrymen his test subjects, and at the focal point of his research was the ratio of fire. "Why the subject of fire ratios under combat conditions has not been long and searchingly explored, I don't know," Marshall wrote. "I suspect that it is because in earlier wars there had never existed the opportunity for systematic collection of data." [Emphasis added.]

Opportunity aplenty existed in Europe: more than 1200 rifle companies did their work between June 1944 and V-E day, 10 months later. But Marshall required by his own standard two and sometimes three days with a company to examine one day's combat. By the most generous calculation, Marshall would have finished "approximately" 400 interviews sometime in October or November 1946, or at about the time he was writing Men Against Fire.

This calculation assumes, however, that of all the questions Marshall might ask the soldiers of a rifle company during his interviews, he would unfailingly want to know who had fired his weapon and who had not. Such a question, posed interview after interview, would have signalled that Marshall was on a particular line of inquiry, and that regardless of the other information Marshall might discover, he was devoted to investigating this facet of combat performance. John Westover, usually in attendance during Marshall's sessions with the troops, does not recall Marshall's ever asking this question. Nor does Westover recall Marshall ever talking about ratios of weapons usage in their many private conversations. Marshall's own personal correspondence leaves no hint that he was ever collecting statistics. His surviving field notebooks show no signs of statistical compilations that would have been necessary to deduce a ratio as precise as Marshall reported later in Men Against Fire. The "systematic collection of data" that made Marshall's ratio of fire so authoritative appears to have been an invention.

...

History has a savage way about it. A reputation may be made or unmade when history seizes upon part of a life and reduces it to caricature. S.L.A. Marshall was one of the most important commentators on the soldier's world in this century. The axiom upon which so much of his reputation has been built overshadows his real contribution. Marshall's insistence that modern warfare is best understood through the medium of those who actually do the fighting stands as a challenge to the disembodied, mechanistic approaches that all too often are the mainstay of military theorists and historians alike.